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1A Risk Assessment Framework for Cloud
Computing
Karim Djemame, Member, IEEE, Django Armstrong, Jordi Guitart, and Mario Macias
Abstract—Cloud service providers offer access to their resources through formal Service Level Agreements (SLA), and need well-
balanced infrastructures so that they can maximise the Quality of Service (QoS) they offer and minimise the number of SLA violations.
This paper focuses on a specific aspect of risk assesment as applied in cloud computing: methods within a framework that can be used
by cloud service providers and service consumers to assess risk during service deployment and operation. It describes the various
stages in the service lifecycle wheres risk assessment takes place, and the corresponding risk models that have been designed
and implemented. The impact of risk on architectural components, with special emphasis on holistic management support at service
operation, is also described. The risk assessor is shown to be effective through the experimental evaluation of the implementation, and
is already integrated in a cloud computing toolkit.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, risk assessment, risk modelling, holistic management
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1 INTRODUCTION
ADVANCES in cloud computing research have inrecent years resulted in considerable commercial
interest in utilising cloud infrastructures to support com-
mercial applications and services. However, significant
developments in the areas of risk and dependability are
necessary before widespread commercial adoption can
become a reality. Specifically, risk management mecha-
nisms need to be incorporated into cloud infrastructures,
in order to move beyond the best-effort approach to ser-
vice provision that current cloud infrastructures follow
[1].
The importance of risk management in cloud com-
puting is a consequence of the need to support various
parties involved in making informed decisions regarding
contractual agreements. The lack of adequate confidence
in a cloud service in terms of the uncertainties associated
with its level of quality may prevent a cloud service
consumer from adopting cloud technologies. Although
the provision of a zero-risk service is not practical, if
not impossible, an effective and efficient risk assessment
of service provision and consumption, together with
the corresponding mitigation mechanisms, may at least
provide a technological insurance that will lead to high
confidence of cloud service consumers on one side and
a cost-effective and reliable productivity of cloud service
providers resources on the other side.
Consider an end-user (a service provider or a bro-
ker acting on their behalf) who is a participant from
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the broader public approaching the cloud in order to
perform a task comprising of one or more services.
The end-user must indicate the task and associated
requirements formally within a Service Level Agreement
(SLA) template. Based on this information, the end-user
wishes to negotiate access with Infrastructure Providers
(IPs) offering these services, in order that the task is
completed.
IPs offer access to resources and services through
formal SLAs specifying risk, price and penalty. Interac-
tions between IPs and end-users can then be governed
through a contract defining the IP’s obligations, the price
the end-user must pay and the penalty the IP needs to
pay in the event that it fails to fulfill its obligations.
The use of SLAs to govern such interactions in cloud
computing is gaining momentum [1]. Moreover, IPs need
well-balanced infrastructures, so they can maximise the
Quality of Service (QoS) and minimise the number of
SLA violations. Such an approach increases the economic
benefit and motivation of end-users to outsource their IT
tasks. A prerequisite to this is the IP’s trustworthiness
and their ability to successfully deliver an agreed SLA.
Risk assessment is considered in all phases of the
service lifecycle for these stakeholders: end-users dur-
ing service deployment and operation, and IPs during
service admission control and internal operations.
In service deployment, risk assessment is considered
in the following context: 1) before sending an SLA
request to IPs, what is the risk of dealing with them, and
which IP is less risky? 2) Once an IP receives an SLA
request, what is the risk of dealing with the end-user
from which the request came from? 3) In the admission
control the IP performs, what is the risk of accepting the
SLA request? and 4) Once an end-user receives an SLA
offer, what is the the risk associated with deploying a
service in an IP i.e. entering an SLA with the IP? Risk
2assessment allows the IP to selectively choose which SLA
requests to accept (and consequently which to monitor
and fulfil at service operation). On the other hand, end-
users must make informed, risk-aware decisions on the
SLA quotes they receive from the IPs so that the decision
is acceptable and balances cost, time and risk. They
clearly benefit from an evaluation of the risk of an SLA
violation, since it allows them to determine the economic
implications of agreeing to a particular SLA offer. This
is also where risk assesment can play a key role by
evaluating the reliability of an IP’s own risk assessment.
In service operation, risk assessment helps support
the following: 1) from the end-user perspective, what
is the risk of failure of the SLA? 2) similarly from the
IP perspective what is the risk of failure of a specific
SLA? of the cloud infrastructure? Here, IPs perform con-
tinuous risk assessment at service operation, monitoring
low-level events from the infrastructure such as risk of
failure of physical hosts/VMs, security, legal, and data
management risk. On the other hand, end-users also
perform continuous risk assessment, monitoring service
level non-functional Quality of Service (QoS) metrics
such as the availability of VMs.
Risk assessment has been introduced into utility com-
puting such as Grids and clouds either as a general
methodology [2], [3], [4] or focusing on a specific type
of risk, such as security and SLA fulfilment [5], [6].
However, the aim of this paper is to propose a risk
assessment framework for cloud service provision, in
terms of assessing and improving the reliability and
productivity of fulfilling an SLA in a cloud environment.
Based on this framework, a software tool is designed
and implemented as a risk assessment related module,
which can be integrated into other high level cloud
management and control software systems for both end-
users and IPs. This paper builds on our existing research
on Risk Assessment within the context of Cloud Com-
puting. The nature of SLAs in clouds and their associated
workloads are different to those in other paradigms and
thus effects the event prediction and the associated risks
that must be considered within any given framework.
The life-cycle of a Cloud, orientated towards long lived
services, also differs from that of Grids and a risk assess-
ment framework must therefore consider its semantics to
service deployment and operation.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• A risk assessment framework for cloud computing.
Risk assessment is supported at service deployment
and operation, and benefit both end-users as well
as infrastructure providers.
• A model for infrastruture providers to assess at
service operation the risk of failure of 1) physical
nodes; 2) VMs; 3) SLAs, and 4) entire cloud infras-
tructure.
• An evaluation of the risk model on a cloud infras-
tructure and through simulation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 introduces the risk management discipline.
Section 3 explains the vision of risk in cloud computing.
Section 4 presents the proposed risk model, section 5
its implementation, and Section 6 its evaluation on a
cloud infrastructure. Section 7 presents some related
work. In conclusion, section 8 provides a summary of
the research.
2 RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management plays an important role in a wide
range of fields, including statistics, economics, systems
analysis, biology and operations research. Risk is defined
as the possibility of a hazardous event occurring that will
have an impact on the achievement of objectives. Risk is
measured in terms of consequence (or impact) and likelihood
of the event [7]. Qualitatively, risk is considered propor-
tional to the expected losses which can be caused by an
event and to the probability of this event. Quantitatively,
it is the product of probability of hazardous event and
the consequences.
The most central concepts in risk management are the
following: an asset is something to which a party assigns
value and hence for which the party requires protection.
An unwanted incident is an event that harms or reduces
the value of an asset. A threat is a potential cause of an
unwanted incident whereas a vulnerability is a weakness,
flaw or deficiency that opens for, or may be exploited
by, a threat to cause harm to or reduce the value of
an asset. Finally, risk is the likelihood of an unwanted
incident and its consequence for a specific asset, and
risk level is the level or value of a risk derived from its
likelihood and consequence. For example, a server is an
asset, a threat may be a computer virus, the vulnerability
a virus protection not up to date, which leads to an
unwanted incident: a hacker getting access to this server.
The likelihood of the virus creating a back door to the
server may be medium, but the integrity of the server
(consequence in terms of harm) may be high.
A fundamental issue in the characterisation and rep-
resentation of risk is to properly and appropriately carry
out the following steps:
• Analyse the triggering events of the risk, and by
breaking down those events formulate adequately
their accurate structure.
• Estimate the losses associated with each event in
case of its realisation.
• Forecast the probabilities or the possibilities of the
events by using either statistical methods with prob-
abilistic assessments, or subjective judgements with
approximate reasoning.
After the possible risks have been identified, they are
assessed in terms of their potential severity of loss and
probability or possibility of occurrence. This process is
called Risk Assessment (RA). The input quantities for
Risk Assessment can range from simple to measurable
(when estimating the value of a lost asset or contracted
penalty associated with non-delivery) to impossible to
know for certain (when trying to quantify the probability
3of a very unlikely event). Risk Management (RM) is the
process of measuring or assessing risk and on the basis
of the results developing strategies to manage that risk
and control its implications. Managing a type of risk
includes the issues of determining whether an action
or a set of actions - is required, and if so finding the
optimal strategy of actions to deal with the risk. The
actions applied in a comprehensive strategy consist of
an appropriate combination of the following measures:
• Transferring the risk to another party.
• Avoiding the risk.
• Reducing the negative effects of the risk, and
• Accepting or absorbing some or all of the conse-
quences of a particular risk.
In Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) a numerical
estimate is made of the probability that a defined harm
will result from the occurrence of a particular event.
Quantitative Risk Analysis is performed on risks that
have been prioritized. The effects on those risk events
are analysed and a numerical rating to those risks are
assigned. A risk level can then be represented using for
example a 7-point rating scale [8]: 1: trivial, 2: minor (-),
3: minor (+), 4: significant (-), 5: significant (+), 6: major,
and 7: catastrophic.
This paper focuses on a specific aspect of risk manage-
ment as applied to cloud computing: methods that can
be used by a cloud provider to evaluate risk through
the service lifecycle: construction, deployment, and op-
eration. In this context, assets include physical nodes,
virtual machines, SLAs etc. Considering a physical node
as an asset, a threat may be a loss of its connectivity,
the vulnerability a fault in hardware, which leads to an
unwanted incident: the failure of the resource.
3 RISK AWARE CLOUD COMPUTING - THE
FRAMEWORK
The overall vision is the provision of a framework
allowing individuals to negotiate and consume cloud
resources using Service Level Agreements (SLA). This
embraces an extended approach to the utility computing
business model, which fits in an open market business
model (for example for access to infrastructure as a
service) as used in sectors such as finance, automotive,
and energy. This section presents the main actors (service
provider and infrastructure provider), and the various
stages in the service lifecycle where risk assessment takes
place.
3.1 Actors
The main actors are Service Providers (SPs) and Infras-
tructure Providers (IPs):
• Service providers offer economically efficient ser-
vices using hardware resources provisioned by in-
frastructure providers. SPs participate in all phases
of the service lifecycle, by implementing the service,
deploying it, and overseeing its operation.
• Infrastructure providers offer physical infrastructure
resources required for hosting services. Their goal
is typically to maximize their profit by making
efficient use of the infrastructure and by possibly
outsourcing partial workloads to partner IPs. The
application logic of a service is transparent to the
IPs, which instead uses VMs as black-box manage-
ment units.
The element of focus is the service. A service can
provide any sort of functionality to an end-user. This
functionality is delivered by one or more VMs, which
each run applications that deliver the service logic. Each
service is associated with a number of functional and
non-functional requirements specified in a service man-
ifest. The functional requirements include a requested
performance profile, both in terms of hardware con-
figuration, e.g., amount of physical memory and CPU
characteristics for VMs as well as application-level Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs) such as transaction rate,
number of concurrent users, response time, which are
used for elastic auto-scaling. The Service Provider can if
needs be over come uncertainty associated with the per-
formance profile through acquired historic knowledge of
other applications it has deployed. Thus this issue can
be abstracted away from and no longer becomes a con-
cern of the underlying risk model. The non-functional
requirements include, e.g., service and security level
policies, and ecological profile. All of these requirements
in the manifest configure the service for deployment
and operation. The service manifest is thus the principal
mean of interaction between the SP and IP.
3.2 Risk Assessment and Service Lifecyle
Consider the situation where an IP wishes to offer use
of its resources as a pay-per-use service to potential
SPs, and where the use of SLAs govern the interaction
between them. An IP may need to implement an effective
risk assessment procedure prior to making an SLA offer.
If the SP’s service requirements can be satisfied, the
IP makes an SLA offer. The SP either commits to the
SLA or rejects it. Risk is then considered in all phases
of the service lifecycle for the two stakeholders: SP
during service construction, deployment, and operation,
and IP during service admission control and internal
operations.
In the risk assessment process specific issues imposed
by law or regulations, as well as operational risks inher-
ent to the use of Cloud systems, either local or external
assets, are found. These risks can have a great impact
on the operation of SPs and IPs, making it inconsistent
with their respective business strategies, represented
by means of Business Level Objectives (BLOs) and/or
constraints. Therefore, a risk assessment methodology of
cloud service provision is needed in order to assess and
improve the reliability and productivity of fulfilling an
SLA in a cloud environment, and the impact of some
traditional risks must be re-evaluated in clouds. Figure
41 shows an overview of the stages where risk assessment
takes place.
3.2.1 Service Deployment
An overview of the SP-IP interaction at service deploy-
ment when the SLA negotiation takes place, and the
corresponding risk assessments are explained next.
Infrastructure Provider Risk Assessment
One of the objectives of the SP is to assess the IP before
committing to an SLA. To support its strategic and
business planning, the SP requires protection of specific
assets, namely the actual SLAs as well as its reputation.
This is called in risk assessment an indirect asset, which
is an asset that, with respect to the target and scope of
the risk analysis, is harmed only via harm to other assets.
The harm relation expresses that an asset can be harmed
through harm to another asset. Therefore, the SP, before
sending an SLA request, assesses the risk of dealing with
all known IPs (see Figure 1, stage 1).
Such provider assessment builds on the research in
[6] which addresses the problem of dealing with miss-
ing provider information to produce a ranking of the
providers based on specified criteria. The assessment of
an IP by an SP is based on seven criteria, which are
based on information collected from Cloud providers
willing to share this information with the general public,
or proposed guidelines by the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) [9] and the European
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)[10].
The assessment criteria are:
1) Past SLA Performance: this includes the number of
past successful SLAs.
2) Geography Information: Geographic threat level,
stability level, jurisdiction transparency level, juris-
diction overlapping level.
3) Certifications and Standards Compliance: facility
related certification level, operation related certi-
fication level, and industry standard compliance
level.
4) Business Stability: this includes for example the
business history, the number of employees, and the
number of customers.
5) General Infrastructure Practice: Available compute
resources, available spare resources, average node
availability, storage backup frequency.
6) General Security Practice: facility security level.
7) General Privacy Practice: facility and data access
control level, personal data protection level.
A value between 0 and 1 is computed for each of the
criterion by evaluating an IP with respect to a number
of sub-criteria. These values are used as the basis for
the evaluation. There are two important features of the
evaluation system. Firstly, it takes into account SP’s pref-
erences. Different SPs are likely to value the criteria dif-
ferently. Therefore SPs are able to specify the importance
of each of the criteria, e.g. on a scale of 0 to 10. These are
then translated into criteria weights that encapsulate the
amount of influence a particular criterion should have
and incorporated into the provider evaluation. Secondly,
it is able to handle missing data. Some IPs may be
unwilling to share all of the information necessary to
compute the criteria values. Alternatively, data may have
been corrupted.
This is achieved through an implementation of
Dempster-Shafer Analytical Hierarchy Process (DS-
AHP) [11], whereby each decision alternative (in this
case each IP) is mapped onto a belief and plausibility
interval. Consider a set of providers as corresponding to
the proposition that the providers in that set are prefer-
able to all other providers considered in the evaluation
but not to each other. The SP preference weights, wi,
are computed for each criterion, i = 1..N . Pair-wise
comparison of decision alternatives (for providers) are
used to derive weights for the criteria, r
(i)
j for the i
th
criterion and jth provider. A weight or Basic Probability
Assignment (BPA) is computed for each provider, and
providers which are indistinguishable with respect to a
criterion are grouped together as a single proposition
(that the providers in this group are the best alternative).
This results in the bpas in the form mi(s) where s is a
set of one or more providers. Criteria bpas are combined
using Dempster’s rule of combination [11]. A set of
intervals [Belief, Plausibility] for each single IP are then
used to compute the order of preference for the IPs.
Finally, a preference value for provider A relative to
provider B is computed, and if P (A > B) > 0.5 then
provider A is preferred. Details on the risk assessment
model are found in [1], [12], [6].
Service Provider Risk Assessment
An IP receives an SLA request and assesses the risk
of dealing with the SP from which the request came
from (see Figure 1, stage 2). Similarly, to support their
strategic and business planning, IPs require protection of
their assets, which include their infrastructure (physical
hosts, Virtual Machines, networks, disk storage) as well
as indirect assets, in this case their reputation. The DS-
AHP based assessment (see Section 3.2.1) of the SP is
done using the following criteria based on proposed
guidelines by NIST [9] and ENISA[10].:
1) Past SLA Performance: this includes the number of
past successful SLAs deployed by the SP.
2) Business Stability: this includes for example the
business history, the number of employees, and the
number of customers.
3) General Security Practice: Facility Security Level.
Details on the risk assessment model are found in [1],
[12], [6].
SLA Request Risk Assessment
The IP assesses the risk of accepting the SLA request
from the SP (see Figure 1, stage 3). To do so: 1) the IP’s
Admission Controller (AC) determines whether or not
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to accept a new service request by handling the tradeoff
between increased revenue and increased workload as
well as the impact on running services, and 2) the IP
carries out a risk assessment based on the requirements
specified in the service manifest, which may include
physical nodes, security, and legal requirements to name
a few.
The assessment of physical nodes’ risk of failure
within cloud infrastructures builds on the research in
[13] which is based on Semi-Markov models. However,
the risk of failure is assessed considering the cloud
resource historical information stored in the IP’s Histor-
ical Database and the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of the Time To Fail (TTF). This enables an IP
to identify infrastructure bottlenecks, estimate the like-
lihood of physical host failures and identify possible
infrastructure bottlenecks.
Security is a priority concern for cloud service con-
sumers; many of them will make buying choices on the
basis of the reputation for confidentiality, integrity and
availability of, and the security services offered by, a
cloud provider. Therefore, this is a strong driver for an
IP to improve security practices.. The IP faces security
challenges posed by the transparency of distribution,
abstraction of configuration and automation of services
and needs to perform a detailed threat analysis across
different deployment scenarios (private, bursting, feder-
ation or multi-clouds). Our research in [14] presents a
systematic approach for threat analysis based on stan-
dard threats for distributed systems, adopted in cloud
computing. The proposed methodology uses the CORAS
risk modeling methodology [15] coupled with Informa-
tion Risk Analysis Methodology (IRAM), tailored for
specific cloud computing security risk assessment.
The IP may also require to carry out a legal risk
assessment for the benefit of legal compliance. Details
on the legal issues surrounding risk assessment in cloud
computing are found in [16]. Specifically, risk is analysed
regarding data protection and security, and the require-
ments of an inherent risk inventory are presented.
Once the various risks in relation to the requirements
in the service manifest are assessed, an aggregated risk
(failure of physical node, security, and legal) of accepting
the SLA request is estimated, possibly allocating weights
to the various risks depending on the service require-
ments. The IP then sends a response back to the SP, either
in the form of an SLA offer or rejection.
SLA Offer Risk Assessment
The SP assesses the risk associated with deploying a
service in an IP (entering an SLA with the IP) (see Figure
1, stage 4).
6Since an IP may not want to share detailed data
about their own infrastructure or their risk assessment
methods, it is difficult for the SP (and possibly cloud
brokers) to verify the reliability of IP’s risk assessment.
This problem may be exacerbated if the SP wishes to
choose the best (according to their own criteria) IP
for their services and have little or no past dealings
with many providers. When making an SLA offer, an
IP usually presents an associated availability to the
entity (SP) it is negotiating with. Most of commercial
cloud providers such as Amazon ”guarantee” a service
availability of 99%. This metric can be translated into a
Probability of Failure (PoF), therefore a risk of service
unavailability. However, the SP will not necessary trust
this IP’s metric. Even if the IP utilises sophisticated and
accurate risk assessment techniques, they might wish
to convince the SP that the PoF is lower than it is
in reality, in order to increase the likelihood that the
SLA negotiation is successful [17]. If the IP’s offered
PoFs were consistently lower than the actual PoF by a
considerable margin then its reputation may be damaged
and the SP may become aware of this. However, if the
difference is not too large (while still being statistically
significant and therefore potentially having an impact
on the SP’s own assessment) it may require a significant
amount of historical data to enable the IP’s inaccuracy
or dishonesty to be identified. Hence it would clearly be
of value if the SP could obtain additional information
to provide some indication of the reliability of an IP’s
risk assessment prior to accepting an SLA offer. This
information is a measure of the IP’s reliability and the
SP’s own PoF estimate (which differs from the provider’s
if it is considered unreliable).
A risk model is used for evaluating IP’s reliability, with
respect to systematic errors and is based on research
in [6]. Here, systematic errors refer to provider errors
whereby their risk assessments exhibit a typical trend
in the sense that they tend to overestimate the PoF or
tend to underestimate the PoF. The scenario from the
SPs perspective is as follows:
1) An IP makes an SLA offer and includes a PoF
estimate (e.g. 99%) associated with that SLA.
2) Each time an offer is accepted, the details are stored
in the SP’s historical database, including the final
status (Success/Fail) and the offered PoF.
With this information, the problem is now to deter-
mine whether risk assessment based on IPs past data can
be considered reliable. The reliability assessment model
is based on: 1) a reliability estimate for systematic errors;
2) scenarios where the IP is under or over estimating
the PoF, and 3) Accounting for static/dynamic provider
behaviour. The IP dynamic behaviour may change as a
consequence of a variety of factors, e.g.
• The IPs infrastructure is updated. This may have
an effect on the reliability of subsequent risk assess-
ments.
• The IPs risk assessment methodology or model pa-
rameterisation may change.
• The IPs policy may change, for example due to
economic considerations. For example, they may
decide that they can make more profit if they start
to give overoptimistic estimates to an SP/broker, in
order to persuade them to agree offers.
3.2.2 Service Operation
Once the service is deployed and its operation is under-
way, the SP and IP need a combination of monitoring
and assessment in order to create a self-managed cloud
infrastructure driven on one hand by their Business-
Level Objectives (BLO), and by the SLA fulfillment on
the other. For an IP BLOs represent how to manage
the infrastructure, e.g. reducing costs of operation at the
expense of risk, whereas for the SP they represent how
to manage the service, e.g. scaling in/out, elasticity, and
VM migration to another IP.
SP Dynamic Risk Assessment
The SP requires protection of its assets (running ser-
vices) and therefore performs continuous risk assess-
ment at service operation, monitoring service level non-
functional Quality of Service (QoS) metrics such as
availability of VMs (see Figure 1, stage 5). Service
management involves a wide range of tasks, including
the provision of an information repository for services
deployed on the VMs of IPs, service deployment and
undeployment, and monitoring the execution of services
to ensure SLA fulfillment.
Models are needed to assist the SP in continuously
assess risk as service operation. This will very much
depend on the data available for the SP at service
operation, data the IP is willing to share with the SP,
and the SP’s own historical data.
IP Dynamic Risk Assessment
To protect its assets and as part of SLA fulfilment the IP
performs continual risk assessment at service operation,
monitoring low-level events from the infrastructure such
as risk of failure of physical hosts and VMs, as well as
risk in relation to security, legal, and data management
(see Figure 1, stage 6).
3.3 Summary
This section has presented the risk assessment frame-
work allowing the actors (SPs and IPs) to negotiate and
consume cloud resources using SLAs, as well as the
various risk models these actors make use of at various
stages in the service lifecycle:
• When an SLA negotiation takes place, an SP is able
to assess the risk of dealing with IPs. It is useful for
the SP to know which IP is less risky, as this brings
the confidence that the SLA once signed has a good
chance to be fulfilled.
• When an SLA negotiation takes place, an IP is able
to assess the risk of dealing with an SP. Similarly,
7this is useful for the IP as it brings the confidence
that once the SLA is signed the IP’s assets are
protected ensuring the SLA fulfilment.
• Prior to committing to an SLA, the IP carries out a
risk assessment based on the service requirements.
This is SLA dependent and may include assessing
a security risk, a legal risk, the risk of failure of
physical hosts, or the risk of failure of VMs. The risk
of accepting an SLA request is seen as an aggregate
of various risks.
• Prior to committing to an SLA, the SP carries out a
risk of service unavailability by evaluating the IP’s
reliability with respect to past behaviour. By doing
so, the SP has the confidence that the SLA can be
fulfilled by a reliable IP.
• Once a service is in operation, the SP constantly
monitors the service execution and continuously
performs risk assessment as part of the SLA fulfil-
ment.
• Similarly, the IP constantly monitors its infrastruc-
ture in service operation and continuously performs
risk assessment as part of the SLA fulfilment.
The remainder of this paper will focus on a model that
can be used by an IP at service operation to assess the
risk of failure of 1) physical nodes; 2) VMs; 3) SLAs, and
4) entire cloud infrastructure.
4 RISK ASSESSMENT MODELLING - IP SER-
VICE OPERATION
In order to assess the risk associated with cloud re-
sources based on (real-time) data at service operation,
it is essential to know what data is required for such
risk assessment, and how it is going to be analysed to
estimate the actual risk. For this purpose, a risk inventory
is used and is presented next.
4.1 Elements of Risk
The risk inventory is populated with:
• Assets: Virtual Machine (VM), physical host, SLA,
with a description of their characteristics. Risk
events are assessed in terms of these.
• Incidents / Risk Scenarios: aim to describe any
event, condition or their combination that has the
potential to reduce the capacity or availability of an
asset. Incidents are composed of:
• Vulnerabilities: describe inherent weaknesses of the
asset (e.g. a faulty hardware) and their impact re-
flects the possibility of a risk incident, e.g. violations
of the Quality of Service (QoS), and SLA indicators,
inherent to the assets.
• Threats: represent the other side of the risk which
depends on factors independent to the asset, e.g.
loss of connectivity of a physical host.
• Adaptive capacity: description of the mitigating
strategies in place for the specific asset, e.g. server
replication.
• Impact/Consequence of a risk incident, e.g. failure
of a physical host, and is defined using as degraded
performance, loss of data, or unavailability. The
evaluation is performed according to the indicators
selected to describe the asset as well as associated
costs, e.g. of not meeting predefined service levels.
4.2 Process
A quantitative risk assessment approach which makes
use of measurable, objective data to determine the like-
lihood of events and associated risk is then applied
to estimate the level of risk attached to VMs, Physical
Hosts, and SLAs thanks to the data gathered by the
Cloud Monitoring Infrastructure (CMI). Therefore, an
identification of the elements of risk in the risk inventory
for VMs, Physical Hosts, and SLAs becomes important.
It should be noted that the nature of risks may differ
thus, the quantitative risk estimation too.
Figure 2 shows the risk assessment methodology,
which divides the risk assessment process into the fol-
lowing stages:
Risk Inventory. At this stage, requirements analysis
is performed to identify how the risk inventory is pop-
ulated.
Vulnerability identification. A vulnerability is consid-
ered as a weakness or flaw in system procedures, design
or internal, management controls that can be accidentally
triggered or intentionally exploited. Let each vulnera-
bility be represented as a single bit in the vulnerability
vector:
~V = {Vi} = 1,0 ∀i, i=1,2, . . . n
where Vi represents an individual vulnerability. The
value 1 indicates the presence of this vulnerability in
the system under assessment, otherwise 0.
Threat identification. During a threat analysis process
potential threat sources and actions that may exploit
system vulnerabilities are identified. Information about
threats can be gathered from experts and log files. Let
each threat be represented as a single bit in the threat
vector:
~T = {Tj} = 1,0 ∀j, i=1,2, . . . m
where Tj represents an individual threat. The value
1 indicates the presence of this threat in the system,
otherwise 0.
Data Monitoring. At this stage, the data requirements
that need support are identified. In service operation it
is expected that a cloud monitoring infrastructure will
provide such data.
Event Analysis. An event can be defined as a pair: a
vulnerability and it matching threat. Events can be iden-
tified from facts, which take place in a specific context.
In order to identify the possibility of an event occurring,
the likelihood should be estimated considering factors
of threat-source motivation and capability, and nature
of the vulnerability. Therefore, the likelihood of threat
acting over vulnerability is defined as : Lji = 〈Tj ,Vi〉
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Quantitative Risk Analysis. Risk is defined as the
likelihood of an event and its consequence. After po-
tential events and their likelihood have been identified
the quantitative risk assessment approach is applied to
estimate a level of risk for VMs, Physical Hosts, SLAs
and the IP.
4.3 Model
Individual risks associated with each event (vulnerabil-
ity, threat) are first calculated and then an aggregated
risk for enhancing knowledge based on these individual
risks is estimated. Within the general risk assessment
model, several elements of risk are identified:
Rj,i = Lji · Ii (1)
Thereafter, the risk for an individual element within
an asset under a context specific environment can be
calculated as follows:
RE = 1−
m∏
j=1
(1−Rji) (2)
where E = 1,2, . . . is an individual element of risk
within the asset. The formula only applies in cases when
an element has threats and vulnerabilities associated.
The aggregated risk consists of all individual risks
within an asset and is defined as:
Ragg = 1− (RE1 ·RE2 · . . . REk) (3)
5 IMPLEMENTATION
The risk assessment framework has been implemented
in the context of the OPTIMIS project [1]. This section
provides the framework implementation details as well
as the components involved in the risk assessment pro-
cess at service operation.
5.1 Context
OPTIMIS innovations can be summarized as a combina-
tion of technologies to create a dependable ecosystem of
cloud providers and consumers that will be the founda-
tion of efficient operations of services and infrastructures
[1]. This includes innovations for optimizing the whole
service lifecycle. The main result of OPTIMIS is the OP-
TIMIS Toolkit [18] (see Figure 3), a set of software tools
for cloud providers and users to support various multi-
cloud architectures, optimize the cloud service lifecycle,
and simplify cloud self-management.
The OPTIMIS toolkit simplifies for SPs the develop-
ment of new services, makes informed deployment de-
cisions for these, and monitors their execution. Similarly,
IPs can use OPTIMIS tools to decide whether to accept
additional services and optimize provisioning for the
already hosted ones.
SPs and IPs decision making are based not only
on low-level functional properties, but also on non-
functional factors relating to trust (including reputation),
risk (likelihood-consequence analysis for valuable as-
sets), eco-efficiency (power consumption and ecological
factors), as well as cost (economical models for service
and infrastructure provisioning expenses).
The OPTIMIS Toolkit enables dynamic and pro-active
management of cloud infrastructures and services. This
ensures adaptability, reliability, and scalability of infras-
tructures that handle predicted and unforeseen changes
in services and continuously optimize operation.
5.2 Architectural Components and Interaction
As stated in section 4.2 the data requirements for risk
assessment are provided by the CMI (see Figure 4).
The CMI provides aggregation of data from multiple
Information Providers, management of that data and
a Data Model designed for flexible post-processing of
that monitoring data. It effectively stores, manages and
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Fig. 4. Components Interaction: Monitoring Infrastructure,
Risk Assesor, and Cloud Optimizer/Holistic Manager
offers data to the risk assessor component (see Figure
4), addressing the challenges in relation to the use of
virtualization technologies, the distribution of the infras-
tructure, and the scalability of the applications [19]. It
must be noted that the discloser of internal infrastructure
level monitoring data may be limited if it comes from
a third party. This availability of what monitoring data
can be access would in turn have an impact of the
effectiveness of the risk assessment and could be a
possible extra source of revenue for a provider if the
required data is deemed to be essential to mitigating
one specific risk. This would not have an impact on
other monitoring metrics sources such as those coming
internally from a VM.
The Cloud Optimizer (CO) links directly to the OP-
TIMIS cloud toolkit and components including cloud
service optimisation and risk assessment services. It
combines the monitoring and assessment tools in the OP-
TIMIS toolkit with various management engines in order
to create a self-managed cloud infrastructure driven by
IPs BLOs. The CO consists of two main components: the
Holistic Manager (HM) and the Cloud Manager (CM).
The Holistic Manager ensures reactive and proactive
risk assessment linked to service level goals. The HM is
responsible for harmonizing the operation of the IP risk
management in order to fulfill high-level BLOs which
represent how an IP provider wants to manage the
infrastructure, i.e. set the overall IP risk values. To do so,
the HM translates BLOs to risk-based objective functions
and constraints.
The Cloud Manager is responsible for the actual de-
ployment/release of the different VMs based on the
recommendations given by the risk assessor. In addition,
the CM arbitrates between private versus external de-
ployment of the VMs arbitrating between different cloud
deployment models. The CM receives a notification from
the risk assessor when a risk level goes over/below a
given threshold. When this occurs, the CM forwards this
notification to the low-level managers to try to solve the
issue. If the CM receives subsequent notifications, it ini-
tiates more drastic actions, such as canceling a running
service, or elastic VMs within services. To this end, the
CM repeats the process above but calculating the forecast
of risk for the IP when cancelling the corresponding
VMs.
5.3 Risk Inventory
Considering physical nodes, VMs, SLAs, and entire in-
frastructure as IP’s main assets, the risk model intro-
duced in 4.3 is implemented considering 1) the vulnera-
bilities and threats associated with physical nodes, VMs,
SLAs, and entire infrastructure, and 2) data provided by
the CMI.
As part of implementation of the risk assessor, the
risk inventory introduced in Section 4 plays a critical
role in the output of the risk model and what assets,
threats, vulnerabilities and impacts are considered. The
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following defines the elements of the risk inventory used
as input to the risk model in its current implementation.
5.3.1 Assets
The physical resources of an IP relate directly to its
financial performance. Thus the following items list the
high level assets included in the current implementation
of the risk assessor:
• Computational Resources
• Storage Resources (both volatile and non-volatile)
• Networking Resources
5.3.2 Threats
Currently three external threats have been considered in
the current implementation of the risk assessor and are
defined in relation to the previously defined IP assets:
• Denial of Service: A malicious attacker causes a
spike in resource usage and service requests are
dropped.
• Flash Crowd: A sharp increase in the number of
service users cause resource capacity to be exceeded
and service requests to be dropped.
• Poor Quality Hardware Vendor: A vendor provides
an IP with hardware that exhibits higher than nor-
mal failure rates. The hardware failures prevent
requests from being serviced.
5.3.3 Vulnerabilities
The internal vulnerabilities of the IP are defined as a
shortfall in the following resources due either to exceed-
ing resource capacity or hardware failure at the physical,
virtual or infrastructure level, when trying to meet a
service’s defined QoS:
• CPU
• Memory
• Network Bandwidth
• Disk Storage
5.3.4 Impacts
The impacts of both a lack of resource capacity and
failure of a resource are as follows:
• Physical Resource:
– Capacity Exceeded: Medium
– Failure: Medium
• Virtual Resource:
– Capacity Exceeded: Low
– Failure: Low
• IP Resource:
– Capacity Exceeded: High
– Failure: High
It should be noted however that these lists of elements
are not meant to be exhaustive as there are many pos-
sible extensions, which are touched on in Section 6.3.
In the subsequent section these elements of the Risk
Inventory are used in experimentation.
6 EVALUATION
To evaluate the IP Service Operation risk model, two
experiments have been conducted. The first is performed
in the context of a real cloud testbed using the prototype
risk assessor. The second, takes a black box approach
and fabricates input for the risk assessor enabling greater
control over experimental variables.
A numerical rating from 1 to 7 is assigned to the var-
ious risks to be assessed (physical node, VM, SLA, and
infrastructure) as introduced in section 2. This setting is
carried out by the HM in a proactive mode to control
the operation of the IP risk assessment in order to fulfill
high-level BLOs and is directly linked to existing service
level goals.
Recall that risk is defined as the likelihood of an event
and its impact. For simplicity the internal vulnerabilities
of the cloud infrastructure are defined as a shortfall in
physical and virtual resources due exceeding resource
capacity (CPU, memory, network bandwidth, and disk
storage). The risk of SLA failure is translated as the
aggregate of the risk of failure of physical hosts and VMs
the SLA makes use of.
As stated in section 4.2 the data requirements for risk
assessment are provided by the CMI (see Figure 4).
In service operation the risk assessor is continuously
running and its data requirements in relation to vulner-
abilities are provided by the CMI. Once a particular risk
level is reached the risk assessor initiates an automatic
notification to the CM. An activation threshold prevents
the CM from initiating corrective actions unnecessarily
in the presence of abrupt but short-lived risk level peaks.
The activation threshold indicates the maximum number
of accumulated times (based on the monitoring rate of
physical hosts and VMs) that a risk level can be above
before attempting corrective actions. Corrective actions
depend on the particular risk that has reached the thresh-
old. For instance, when the CM is alerted of a potential
VM failure, it will assess whether restarting that VM
complies with the business objectives of the provider,
and in that case, it will select the most appropriate node
to restart it. Similarly, when the CM is alerted of a
potential host failure, it will assess the migration of all
the VMs running in that host to other hosts.
For clarity, all illustrated results show time series
graphs, expressed as Time since the Unix epoch on
the x-axis with Risk-Level on the y-axis. The objectives,
experimental setup and results of each are discussed in
detail in the following sections.
6.1 Prototype Evaluation
This section discusses the outcome of testing the proto-
type risk assessor and its accompanying real time risk
visualization tool.
6.1.1 Objective
The objective of this experiment was to ascertain that
the risk model when monitoring a real service on an
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OPTIMIS cloud testbed can provide an end user with
real time feedback on current service risk levels.
6.1.2 Experimental Setup
The experiment was performed on an cloud testbed
comprised of two physical machines each in turn com-
prised of a Dual AMD Opteron 6234 (16 Core) Processors
with 64GB of RAM. The risk assessor was deployed as
part of the wider OPTIMIS toolkit. An OPTIMIS service
manifest was deployed that comprised of 8 VMs each
providing 2 virtual CPU cores and 2GB of memory. Each
VM executed an idle Tomcat container on deployment.
The risk assessor was invoked on deployment and took
monitoring metrics from the OPTIMIS monitoring infras-
tructure.
6.1.3 Results
Figure 5 shows the outcome of the evaluation from the
perspective of the real-time risk visualization tool. The
user interface illustrates the four levels of risk associ-
ated with the deployment of this service in the IP’s
infrastructure. From the figure it can be seen that there
are two initial periods of high risk. The first is due to
the resource utilization of the service VM’s operating
system during the boot-up sequence. The second spike is
caused by the resource utilization of the tomcat container
starting up and deploying its services. The risk levels
then later subside as resource utilization stabilizes. If
a conservative approach towards risk was adopted by
the HM by considering a risk level of 2 and above as
significant then the risk assessor would have initiated an
automatic notification to the CM.
6.2 Functional Evaluation
The aim of this functional evaluation of the risk assessor
is to ascertain the effect of cloud environment and risk
inventory input on the output over time of the risk
assessment model for IP service operation via the use
of fabricated monitoring metrics. To set the scene, the
experimental scenario is motivated via a hypothetical
IPs desire to maintain profitability and meet financial
obligations to its stakeholders. To achieve this goal, an
IP running numerous services uses risk assessment to
prevent or mitigate the cost of breaking end-user agreed
Quality of Service (QoS) through the protection of its
assets.
6.2.1 Objective
The objective of this evaluation is to expose the rela-
tionship and correlation between the four risk levels of
the model. Additionally, the experiment will uncover
the effects of a different Cloud environment on the risk
models output and disclose the ramifications of running
the risk assessments on different types of service with
varying attributes.
6.2.2 Experimental Setup
This evaluation considers a hypothetical IP that has ten
physical machines with the following characteristics: 8
CPU Cores, 4GB RAM, 1Gbit NIC, 4TB HDD, 0.001%
Porbability of Failure. Through the course of the evalu-
ation three different service profiles with the following
virtual machine characteristics are used:
TABLE 1
Virtual Machine Characteristics
Service
Profile
CPU
Cores
RAM Network Disk
Storage
Chance
of
Failure
1 1 512 100Mbit 100GB 0.002%
2 2 1024 100Mbit 200GB 0.002%
3 4 2048 100Mbit 300GB 0.002%
These service profiles are representative of the typi-
cal small, medium and large virtual machine instances
provisioned by real cloud providers such as Amazon.
In addition to these service profiles two service work-
loads were used. The first, a low variance workload
with between 25-50% resource utilization, the second a
high variance workload with between 25% and 100%
resource utilization, generated using a uniform normal
distribution. Virtual machines are allocated to physical
resources using a round robin approach to maximise
resource utilization and the assets of the IP.
To evaluate the risk assessor three experiments have
been devised. The first experiment considers the impact
of running 1 to 10 concurrent homogeneous services
comprised of 5 VMs using a low variance workload.
A new service is added every 10 time steps. This ex-
periment is repeated three times, each time using a
different service profile. This experiment will ascertain
the impact of increasing resource utilization over time
on the four risk levels. The second experiment considers
2 services using Service Profile One with a low variance
workload and Service Profile Three with a high variance
work load. Each service is composed of 10 VMs. This
experiment will ascertain the impact of workload on
risk level between concurrently executing services. The
final experiment executes 3 concurrent services each of
a different service profile composed of 5 VMs. This
experiment will confirm that the utilization of an IP’s
resources only impacts a service’s risk levels when the
service is actually making use of these resources.
6.2.3 Results
The following section discuss the results of the three
experiments using the previously outlined profiles and
experimental setup. Figures 6, 7 and 8 show the results
of running one to ten concurrent services using Service
Profile One with 5 VMs per service.
The figures show that as the capacity of the cloud
increases there is an associated increase across all Risk
levels. This is more pronounced in both the Physical
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Fig. 5. Four Levels Risk Assessment at Service Operation
Fig. 6. 1-10 Homogeneous Concurrent Services, Service
Profile One, 5 VM Per Service
Host Risk Level and the Infrastructure Provider Risk
Level where physical resource capacity plays a larger
role in these risk level calculation. As would be expected,
when many services with larger resource requirements
are deployed in an infrastructure provider, the impact is
seen more quickly across all Risk Levels. These figures
also illustrate that the risks associated with physical
resource capacity do not have an impact on the risks
associated with virtual resource capacity. Additionally
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the risk levels
when the capacity of an IP is filled. From this it can
be seen that the Physical Host Risk Level of a service
is greater than the Infrastructure Provider Risk Level.
The Infrastructure Provider Risk Level adjusts capacity
related risks with the risks to an IP across all currently
deployed services. Thus if a IP has many services run-
ning and is reaching its capacity but the service of
interest is consuming a smaller proportion of the total
resources available from the IP, this is perceived to be a
lower risk to the service.
Fig. 7. 1-10 Homogeneous Concurrent Services, Service
Profile Two, 5 VM Per Service
In addition, these figures show the relationship be-
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Fig. 8. 1-10 Homogeneous Concurrent Services, Service
Profile Three, 5 VM Per Service
tween Physical Host Risk Level and Virtual Machine
Risk Level, where both resource capacity risks are ac-
counted for in the SLA Risk Level. Since the Virtual
Machine Risk Level remains relatively static as the num-
ber of services running on the IP increases, the rate at
which the SLA Risk Level increases is less. Finally, the
figures show that when the physical resources used by
a service are shared and multi-tenant to other services,
the Physical Host Risk Level to the service of interests
increases due to the increasing perceived impact this has
on the performance of the service.
Fig. 9. 2 Concurrent Heterogeneous Services, Left: Ser-
vice Profile One (Low Variance), Right: Service Profile
Two (High Variance), 10 VMs,
Figures 9 shows the results of running two services
concurrently with different workload characteristics. The
left graph shows that the high variance workload of the
larger service (Service Profile Three) shown on the right
has an impact on both the Physical Resource Risk Level
and the Infrastructure Provider Risk Level of the smaller
service (Service Profile One). Finally, the experiment
shown in Figure 10 shows how the Physical Host Risk
Level accounts for only the relevant capacity related
risks to a service. Thus this risk level only considers the
actual physical resources usage of a service within an
IP and not those used by other services. The graphs left
and center within this figure, share the same resources
while the graph right uses a different subset of resources
within the IP due to the round robin nature of physical
resource allocation to virtual resources. It can be seen
that the Physical Host Risk Level of the service shown
on the right graph is dissimilar to the others as expected.
6.3 Extensions
There are many possible extensions to the risk assessor.
For example, the risk to a service at operation could
be extended to provide risk forecasts by extrapolating
the input data currently passed to the risk model. This
would include a validation to provide a comparison of
real versus forecast values. In addition to this, evaluating
how the failure rates affect the risk model will provide
additional insights into its effectiveness. Furthermore,
the current implementation of the risk assessor supports
a number of scenarios that are considered by the OPTI-
MIS project: (a) cloud federation, (b) private cloud, (c)
multi-cloud, (d) broker, and (e) cloud bursting, which
are imperative for proactive operation of a provider.
These scenarios would benefit from the addition of
further elements in the risk inventory that consider the
additional vulnerabilities and threats associated not only
with failures of physical hosts and VMs, but also with
security, legal, and data management aspects. Further
work is planned to validate the output of the risk asses-
sor and perform further evaluations of the risk model on
different cloud testbeds with services that exhibit a wider
variety of varying attributes, including the consideration
of the size of the hypothetical IP.
7 RELATED WORK
Risk assessment in distributed computing has been ex-
tensively studied in the literature, either as a general
methodology [2], [3], [4] or focusing on a specific type
of risk, such as security and SLA fulfilment [5], [6].
These projects have included objectives ranging from
information protection, evaluation /prediction of QoS
and probability of SLA failures [2], [20].
The objective of the Consequence project [21] is to
provide an information protection framework and to
thereby identify the security risk in sharing data in a
distributed environment. The risk items are used as a
checklist of items to be addressed in the Consequence
architecture, without any assessment of the probability
and the negative impact of a risk item. The SLA@SOI
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Fig. 10. 3 Concurrent Heterogeneous Services, 5 VMs
project [22] does not explicitly address risk assessment,
although it does propose the utilisation of a prediction
service for estimating the probability of software and
network failures, as well as hardware availability in an
attempt to evaluate QoS.
The AssessGrid project [23] proposes a model to es-
timate the probability of SLA failures in Grid envi-
ronments, and considers the probability of n resources
failing for the scheduled duration of a task as well as
the probability that m reserved resources are available
for that duration. The probability of node failure is
calculated by assuming that the node failures represent a
Poisson process, which is non-homogenous in time. The
resource provider risk assessment techniques enable the
identification of infrastructure bottlenecks, evaluate the
likelihood of an SLA violation and, where appropriate,
mitigate potential risk, in some cases by identifying
fault-tolerance mechanisms such as job migration to
prevent SLA violations [24], [25]. The AssessGrid broker
acts as a matchmaker between end-users and providers,
furnishing a risk optimised assignment of SLA requests
to SLA quotes [12] by evaluating the provider reliability
with respect to systematic errors. Here, systematic errors
refer to provider errors whereby their risk assessments
exhibit a typical trend in the sense that they tend to
overestimate/underestimate the risk of failure.
Risk as a basis for proactive or reactive service man-
agement in Clouds can be seen within the domain of
information security / privacy [26]. Information security
is suited to the management of risk in clouds as risk
can be defined and linked to existing ways of expressing
security policies [27]. In these cases an organisation or
user can associate events expressed in policy which can
be measured using risk assessment, proactive and reac-
tive action can then added to the process to act upon the
risk [28]. Risk as a management concept has a significant
background in the concept of systems auditing and third
party insight into systems [29].
A recent study focusing on clouds analyzes the risks of
overbooking resources and proposes a threshold-based
overbooking scheme [30]. The trade-off between over-
booking and performance degradation is closely related
to SLA management, studied e.g. [31] which proposes to
extend standard availability SLAs to also include prob-
ability of successfully launching additional VMs (model
based on CPU usage). They present an algorithmic
framework that uses cloud effective demand to estimate
the total physical capacity required for performing the
overbooking. In order to influence risk assessment along
any business/third party grounds the management and
the setting of the risk assessment is taken outside of the
cloud fabric and turned it into a service level [4]. In
terms of wider resource failure a wide range of studies
exist for distributed computing environments [32], [33].
Risk from a third party service as an extension to risk
assessment mechanisms has also been explored in cloud
environments [34].
In the model proposed in this paper risk is monitored
in terms of computing resource behaviour within the
domain of the cloud infrastructure provider and inter-
faces are presented for third party auditing and control.
The focus is with respect to internal threats to service
execution based on analysis of historical and live data
from the cloud infrastructure. This is important for the
support of a holistic solution including complementary
proactive-reactive risk assessment approaches to tolerate
both physical, VM, SLA and infrastructure failures.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a risk assessment framework
for cloud computing. The framework is beneficial for
end-users and service providers approaching the cloud
to deploy and run services, as well as infrastructure
providers to deploy and operate those services. These
benefits include supporting various parties for making
informed decisions regarding contractual agreements, as
highlighted in Section 5.
Motivating scenarios for the need for a risk assessment
framework in cloud computing were first presented. The
importance of risk assessment at various stages of the
service life cycle was identified, and the models for
assesssing the risk pre-SLA negotiation, SLA negotiation,
and service runtime were presented. The need for mon-
itored historical data is showcased, along with the data
collection process at service runtime.
The risk model the IP uses at service operation to
perform continual risk assessment was developed. The
model relies on monitoring low-level events from the
infrastructure to support the risk of failure in relation
to four assets (physical hosts, VMs, SLAs, and IP in-
frastructure), and considers vulnerabilities and threats
associated with them. The risk model was implemented
and evaluated in the context of a real cloud testbed and
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through fabricated monitoring data that enabled fine-
grained control over experimental variables. The soft-
ware prototype is accompanied with a visualization tool,
which provides real-time feedback on current service
levels. It is integrated in the risk assessment framework
and is a viable contender to enable an IP to identify
infrastructure bottlenecks and mitigate potential risks, in
some cases by identifying fault-tolerance mechanisms to
prevent SLA violations.
The paper has demonstrated the flexibility of the risk
model, which has been illustrated to be easily extended
in several ways, e.g. for the provision of risk forecasts by
extrapolating the input data from the CMI, and by con-
sidering additional vulnerabilities and threats associated
not only with failures of physical hosts and VMs, but
also with security, legal, and data management aspects.
The risk assessment model did not consider the intensity
of the workload running on a cloud resource. However,
there is evidence of a correlation between the type and
intensity of the workload and the failure rate of the
resource [33]. More importantly, extending the model to
cater for this information will provide a more accurate
risk estimation.
The risk assessment framework is fully integrated in
the OPTIMIS toolkit [18], which simplifies cloud self-
management, optimizes the cloud service lifecycle, and
supports various cloud architectures. The holistic man-
agement ensures risk assessment is linked to service
level goals, which combines risk avoidance, reduction
in associated negative effects, or the absorption of some
or all of its consequences. However, in the current
incarnation of the risk assessment framework the SP
dynamic risk assessment is limited due to the lack of
support for service consumer’s side monitoring tools, in
addition to the limited availability of shared monitored
data from IPs. This will be the subject of future research.
The deployment of the OPTIMIS toolkit on a production
cloud would be beneficial to further evaluate the risk as-
sessment framework’s overall performance and usability.
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